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Article

Positive and Negative Externalities in
Real Estate Development
Richard A. Epstein †
INTRODUCTION
Externalities of all sorts and descriptions are a fixed feature
of all real estate development in advanced societies, for much of
the value of owning and using land derives from the simple fact
that everyone has neighbors.1 But having neighbors is a twoedged sword, as they are welcomed on some occasions and
scorned on others. To deal with inevitable appearance of neighbors, legal systems have developed a wide range of land-use control devices that have worked their way into the fabric of modern
law. 2 Thus modern legal systems contain techniques to regulate
the use of land, such as private restrictive covenants and easements on the one side and elaborate local zoning codes and regional growth-control regimes on the other. These same legal
systems often develop devices from rent control to affordable
housing regimes to regulate the price at which real estate can be
sold or rented. 3
The use of these various devices has long been a source of
intellectual disagreement and institutional conflict. What is
needed in many cases is a single mode of analysis that tries to
† Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of
Law; Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; James
Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus and Senior Lecturer,
University of Chicago. I would like to thank Philip Cooper, University of Chicago Law School, Class of 2017, and Bijan Aboutarabi and John Tienken, University of Chicago, Class of 2018, for their usual excellent and thorough research
assistance. Copyright © 2018 by Richard A. Epstein.
1. Stephen Malpezzi, Affordable Housing: Supply Side Innovation?, RUTGERS CTR. FOR REAL EST.: BLOG•RE (Mar. 8, 2018), http://rutgersrealestate
.com/blog-re/affordable-housing-supply-side-innovation.
2. See generally id. (listing a wide range of land-use control devices that
are used in the modern law).
3. Id.
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figure out which of these systems should be welcomed for the
improvements that they generate and which should be condemned for the discord they sow.
In order to achieve that goal, it is necessary to identify which
real estate innovations from behind a veil of ignorance generate
overall social improvements and which tend to result in redistributive struggles that tend to undermine both political stability and economic growth. In order to achieve that end, it is necessary to take a systematic look at the various devices that are
used to identify and control both the negative and positive externalities in real estate markets.
This Article take up that challenge by examining the existence and control of negative and positive externalities in real estate markets from a comparative perspective, with special emphasis on English and American law. These externalities are
present everywhere but assume their greatest importance in regions with high population densities,4 where high land values
make it essential to allow multiple claimants to create overlapping interests in the same parcel of real estate. 5 But how should
these common interests be coordinated? One approach is top
down, where centralized state authorities make the allocative
decisions. The alternative approach is decentralized. The state
simply sets and enforces boundaries between strangers, and
then it lets multiple parties decide privately whether to pool or
to separate their activities. The first approach is marked by noble ambition and backed by claims of dispassionate expertise.
Yet the results are usually disappointing. It is much easier for
governments to keep people apart than to bring them together.
As a rule, voluntary arrangements tend to work better than zoning laws or other compulsory land-use arrangements.
In order to explain and defend this thesis, I shall proceed as
follows. Part I examines the various meanings of the term externality as it is used in law and economics. Part II then launches
a conceptual attack on the externality problem by examining the
idealized conditions in which it cannot exist—namely those in
which all persons obtain their full bundle of rights and obligations from a single owner, so that they wholly consent to the full
4. See generally JOHN P. BLAIR, LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE 30 (1995) (stating the “externality problem increases rapidly

as urban density increases”).
5. See, e.g., GOH Yihan, Tort Law in the Face of Land Scarcity in Singapore, 26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 335, 340 (2009) (discussing the effects of high
population densities and land value on legal property rights in Singapore).
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package of benefits and burdens they receive. In these settings,
any controls over both positive and negative externalities follow
identical paths, given that the owner has every incentive to maximize total revenues from his project, which necessarily requires
the minimization of future negative externalities and allowing,
but not requiring, the creation of future positive ones. Part III
then explores the differing treatments of positive and negative
externalities when neighboring landowners do not acquire property from a single owner. It explains why it is both easier and
more critical to control negative externalities than to create positive ones. It also rejects the provocative proposal of Professor
Ariel Porat to recognize a private-restitution remedy for unrequested benefits. 6 Part IV then illustrates the perils of moving
from the decentralized private law models generated by the single ownership paradigm to various forms of public intervention
in land-use settings, such as zoning laws and affordable-housing
mandates. The contrast is clear. The private models do not allow
for redistributive objectives to weaken productive decisions. The
public models, which operate over a far greater scope, necessarily use coercive power to enforce both land-use regulations
and transfer payments. These interventions are far more vulnerable to political influences, especially when their exercise is not
hedged in by a requirement to compensate parties who have suffered disproportionate losses of their property rights.
I. EXTERNALITIES, BROAD AND NARROW
In its broadest formulation, an externality covers any impact that one party’s activities have on the welfare of another
party.7 In a normal situation we measure externalities by their
effects on other human beings. But often those individuals organize themselves into groups, be they commercial arrangements or social organizations. It is therefore often sensible to
short-circuit the analysis of each person’s individual position by
treating the legal entity as a stand-in for the individual members
whose fortunes have been altered by the activities of another
person. The relevant impacts can be positive or negative, and

6. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
7. THEORY AND MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC EXTERNALITIES 1 (Steven A.
Y. Lin ed., 1976) (“Generally, effects on persons not directly privy to the decision
leading to an activity are termed externalities . . . .”).
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refer not just to real estate transactions, but to all human affairs.8 Under that definition, all actions by all persons and firms,
however innocuous, necessarily generate both sorts of externalities, often to different people. Taken seriously, this definition implies that private markets will inevitably fail because they cannot, in Professor Harold Demsetz’s famous phrase, “internalize
the externalit[ies]” 9 of human action. Government regulation,
which generates its own positive and negative externalities, can
never be categorically ruled out. 10 Thus the system of state control snowballs, under the same broad definition, creating massive externalities, positive or negative, of its own.11
Clearly something is amiss in this grand formulation that
uses a definition of externality that, whatever its intuitive appeal, is too broad for legal or policy work. Any serious examination of the externality problem thus starts by narrowing the class
of externalities for which legal intervention is justified, that is,
to what traditional lawyers called cognizable or actionable
harms. The folly, moreover, of any broad definition is that it
treats any refusal to deal in a competitive market as a negative
externality, which would mean that any action that leaves anyone else worse off may count as an actionable harm that justifies
government intervention. 12 On this expansive view of the world,
A cannot marry B because of the disappointment of C, a rival
suitor. But if the situation were reversed, C’s successful courtship could be blocked by B. Under this definition, there are always overlapping and crippling externalities. Disappointed suitors in competitive markets can always complain of losing one
sale to a rival at which all sales are suspect. The correct view,
therefore, declines to provide compensation for all competitive
losses.
8. See Externality, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/
externality.asp (last visited Apr. 26, 2018) (“An externality is a consequence of
an economic activity experienced by unrelated third parties; it can be either
positive or negative.”).
9. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 347, 357 (1967).
10. Cf. Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local
Governments and the Takings Clause, 181 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1689–97 (2006)
(discussing cascading, intergovernmental externalities).
11. See id.
12. See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly NonCoercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923), for the most famous development of
this concept. For my critique, see Richard A. Epstein, Hayek’s Constitution of
Liberty—A Guarded Retrospective, 30 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 415, 424–26
(2017), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11138-016-0367-7.
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Economic losses, however, need to be taken into account for
common carriers and public utilities, whose duties to serve in a
potential monopoly position generate a correlative duty to offer
service at fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates. 13 Note
that these duties are not symmetrical: potential customers need
not avail themselves of the services supplied by common carriers
or public utilities, but are free to seek or create alternative services to undercut the monopoly power position of the common
carrier or public utility. More generally, the scope of this common carrier exception contracts whenever new technologies convert formerly monopolistic markets into competitive ones, so
that nondiscrimination duties are no longer needed (as is the
case with net neutrality in the provision of telecommunications
services).14
The treatment of these abundant externalities arises with
far greater urgency in real estate markets where close proximity
among neighbors invariably gives rise to both positive and negative externalities, from either consistent or inconsistent land
uses. Coase’s analysis of the problem of social cost anticipates
just that problem in his discussion of Sturges v. Bridgman,
where a physician sought to enjoin a neighboring confectioner
from operating machinery whose vibrations interfered with the
doctor’s examination of patients. 15 That interaction had a second, temporal dimension because the confectioner began his
noisy operations before the physician set up his more sensitive
practice near their party wall.16
The law has two mechanisms for addressing these types of
externalities. It can use legal intervention to control the negative
externalities or to encourage the positive ones. Or it can rely on
private ordering, whereby the parties sort themselves in ways
that minimize the negative externalities and enhance the positive ones. The challenge is to figure out how these two systems
work best together to encourage both efficient sorting and effec-

13. See Epstein, supra note 12, at 436–38.
14. Cf. Press Release, FCC, Chairman Kevin J. Martin Comments on Commission Policy Statement (Aug. 5, 2005), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_
public/attachmatch/DOC-260435A2.pdf (stating that competition decreases necessity of regulation).
15. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8–10
(1960) (analyzing Sturges v. Bridgman [1879] 11 Ch D 852 (C.A.) at 853).
16. Sturges, 11 Ch D at 853–54; Coase, supra note 15, at 8; see also William
F. Baxter & Lillian R. Altree, Legal Aspects of Airport Noise, 15 J.L. & ECON. 1,
3–4 (1972) (discussing the first-in-time rule).
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tive behavioral limitations, whether through centralized planning, private initiative, or collective action. 17 Typically, a mixed
solution that combines zoning and other land-use restrictions,
and private associations offers the best results.
At this stage in the inquiry, it is best to be agnostic as to
both the ultimate distribution of various activities and the devices used for locational and temporal sorting. But the key challenge is to explain why legal systems everywhere give far greater
protection against negative externalities through tort, most notably the law of trespass and nuisance, than they offer compensation through the law of restitution for positive externalities
that are given to someone who supplies an unrequested benefit
to another person. 18 Put otherwise, the law of trespass and nuisance are in general more robust than the law of restitution,
whose application is sharply restricted to cases where a tangible
benefit or service is supplied under conditions of necessity to
someone who has not, and could not, have taken precautions on
his own behalf. 19 At one level, this difference presents a bit of a
puzzle because it looks inconsistent with the famous Coasean agnosticism of causation—one that does not sharply distinguish between conferring a benefit and inflicting a harm.20
Indeed, this inability to precisely identify which of two interacting parties is “responsible” for the externality has spread
from the private law into American constitutional law, in ways
that doubtless echo in other jurisdictions. In Miller v. Schoene,
17. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 947, 947 (1984) (“ The persistent tension between private ordering and government regulation exists in virtually every area known to the law.”).
18. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“ There is no liability in restitution for an
unrequested benefit voluntarily conferred, unless the circumstances of the
transaction justify the claimant’s intervention in the absence of contract.”). For
a discussion of the limiting principles of restitution outlined in the Restatement,
see Michael Traynor, Unjust Enrichment: Some Introductory Suggestions,
68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 899, 900 (2011).
19. See Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle, 67 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1369, 1383–88 (1994) (analyzing the categories of necessity as they pertain to the law of restitution); Saul Levmore, Obligation or Restitution for Best
Efforts, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1411, 1421 (1994) (describing restitution as available
when a party unambiguously benefits and could not be said to have preferred
another option).
20. See Coase, supra note 15, at 13 (“If we are to discuss the problem in
terms of causation, both parties cause the damage. If we are to attain an optimum allocation of resources, it is therefore desirable that both parties should
take the harmful effect (the nuisance) into account in deciding their course of
action.”).
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the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone, expressed its inability to decide whether the owner of cedar trees that harbored a pest that attacked apple trees was
causally responsible for the harm, as the harm was the product
of the joint activities of both parties.21 If the tests for causation
are weak, it becomes difficult in any private dispute to assign
responsibility between the parties. Then, by extension, the same
difficulties arise in constitutional law, where, in the mistaken
words of Justice Antonin Scalia, “the distinction between ‘harmpreventing’ and ‘benefit-conferring’ regulation is often in the eye
of the beholder.” 22 This supposed insight into causation is in fact
a ruinous form of intellectual relativism that kills off general
analysis by endlessly expanding the actionable classes of positive and negative externalities. The building that blocks the view
of A is the same building that enhances the view of B. The bell
which causes earsplitting sounds to C may provide sweet music
to D. It is therefore necessary to craft workable limits on the cognizable claims from both positive and negative externalities.23
II. THE SINGLE-OWNER PARADIGM IN THEORY
The first conceptual step in this inquiry is to conduct, both
theoretically and practically, an intellectual exercise that makes
all externalities in both directions magically disappear. Start by
imagining a single largish plot of land that has a single owner,
and then asking how that owner will dispose of that land over
time to multiple parties in order to maximize his own position
through gains from trade. His initial parceling takes into account all of the downstream imperfections that arise in the definition and enforcement of rights, not only immediately, but over
time. 24 He does this because he knows full well that the initial
sale of any particular unit is not the final transaction. The property can be resold, mortgaged (and foreclosed), bequeathed, or
otherwise given away, and it is necessary that all these takers,
21. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 278–79 (1928). For the history and an
analysis of the case, see WILLIAM FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 151–57 (1995).
22. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992). For my most
recent criticism of this passage, see Richard A. Epstein, Missed Opportunities,
Good Intentions: The Takings Decisions of Justice Antonin Scalia, 6 BRIT. J. AM.
LEGAL STUD. 109, 129 (2017).
23. For a case that rejects the noise claim for extrasensitive plaintiffs, see
Rogers v. Elliot, 15 N.E. 768 (Mass. 1888).
24. For an analogy to the so-called durable monopolist, see generally
Ronald H. Coase, Durability and Monopoly, 15 J.L. & ECON. 143 (1972).
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without differentiation, step into the shoes against all other
claimants as holders of rights who are subject to reciprocal burdens. The entire law of easements and covenants starts with the
premise that at some distant point, the initial units will either
be sold, foreclosed, or transferred by way of gift or will, so that
some mechanism has to be put into place to ensure that the relationships that work for the original buyers, will also persist for
any subsequent transferees. 25 These contingencies are routinely
provided for, even in the absence of any precise knowledge as to
when these events are likely to take place, for the simple reason
that all that matters for the initial design is the certainty that
such transfers will occur. The exact patterns of events is unknown, which proves to make the task somewhat easier because
people are behind a (partial) veil of ignorance. Because the problem is permanent and the exact pattern of events is always unknowable, the legal rules governing easements and covenants
are of great durability. 26
The reason all externalities disappear in this paradigm is
that all initial parties consent to the harms that they suffer, just
as they are empowered to enjoy certain benefits.27 Subsequent
parties are then bound and entitled so long as they receive notice
of the terms of the arrangement, which can be effectively provided both from the chain of title and by recordation. 28 This
knowledge allows them to set a sensible price that reflects both
their benefits and burdens. This single-owner approach also
helps explain rights and responsibilities in other collective endeavors, including corporations and partnerships, and even
charitable organizations. The dual protections of consent and notice apply to all transactions at all times, and thus supply an
effective response to the problems of externalities and sorting.

25. See generally JAMES C. SMITH ET AL., PROPERTY: CASES & MATERIALS
641 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing the development of the law of servitudes and covenants running with the land).
26. See Epstein, supra note 12, at 426–27 (discussing the constancy of basic
institutions of property law and attributing that constancy to the law’s ability
to facilitate transactions in the face of uncertainty).
27. See TERRY L. ANDERSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH 2 n.2 (2014) (noting that it is not entirely
proper to consider externalities when all costs and benefits are captured and
available for decisions by parties).
28. For a basic discussion of how notice improves marketability of land by
permitting purchasers to make informed assessments of the burdens on a parcel, see Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the
Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1284 (1982).
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Practical implementation of this approach is found in
planned unit developments (PUDs), which in general have
proven highly successful precisely because, over time, they learn
to package the right mix of benefits and burdens. 29 Understanding the private approach offers a template for government regulation in the common situation in which separate property owners do not obtain their titles from a single owner. The differences
between the private and public situation matter as well, so that
it is only with caution that one can determine which of the standard PUD rules can work in the public sector. Further, the process
is also dynamic, for as neighborhoods change, the same risk of
obsolescence that takes place with covenants can happen with
public restrictions as well, which suffer various rigidities for
which individual variances, often hard to obtain, can offer only
limited relief. 30 It is therefore necessary to think of private associations as a combination of charters and constitutions, which
contain a mixture of strong vested rights and an elaborate governance structure endowed with the power to tax and spend for
the general welfare of the community.31 The key constraint in
these voluntary associations is that each decision, whether collective or private, should seek to obtain some Pareto improvement—that is leave at least one person better off and no one
worse off. 32
In this paradigmatic system, there is no coercive redistribution whatsoever, as all charitable activities—and there are
29. Much of the success in post–World War II development took place
through this vehicle, including the well-known Levittown project. For an early
discussion, see ROBERT W. BURCHELL WITH JAMES W. HUGHES, PLANNED UNIT
DEVELOPMENT: NEW COMMUNITIES AMERICAN STYLE (1972) (exploring the impact and potential of PUDs, which allow the same land tracts to be used for
residential, commercial, and industrial purposes). For a general discussion of
group ownership of land, see Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE
L.J. 1315, 1322–44 (1993) (analyzing the costs and benefits to both individual
and group land ownership).
30. For an example of the rigidities of covenants, see Western Land Co. v.
Truskolaski, 495 P.2d 624, 627 (Nev. 1972) (rejecting a changed circumstances
claim). For an example of the difficulty of obtaining variances, see Commons v.
Westwood Zoning Board of Adjustment, 410 A.2d 1138, 1143 (N.J. 1980) (remanding denial of variance for further consideration, with the burden of proof
placed on the applicant seeking the variance).
31. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906 (1988) (observing the transition of covenants from conveyances to governance devices).
32. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 8 (1993) (“[I]f no
person in state A is worse off than he was in state B, and at least one person is
better off in state A than he was in state B, then state A must be judged as
superior to state B.”).
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many—are left to separate organizations specifically dedicated
to that purpose.33 Indeed, in these collective situations, the frequent use of pro rata rules suggests that an even stronger constraint than a Pareto improvement should be satisfied—namely,
that the gains generated by these actions track the level of initial
investment to the greatest extent possible. 34 That equalization
condition is intended to maximize the size of the gain at each
decisive step by eliminating the factional conflict over the division of surplus. 35 It is this simple insight that explains, for example, why the fraction of benefits and duties assessed for each
unit is set at the outset of a common unit development, proportionate to the measure assigned in the original agreement.36 Yet
some future interventions will necessarily have a disproportionate impact—for example, one unit might be particularly impacted by the installation of a drainage or ventilation system
that enhances the value of the entire development. So, at that
point, the same basic model addresses the use of cash or in-kind
compensation for extraordinary losses, in order to ensure that
these impositions do not leave any one person or minority group
unambiguously worse off when the membership as a whole prospers. 37
This sentiment is not just a principle of abstract justice, but
one of intense practical importance. It explains why one of the
single most influential sentences in American takings law reads,
quite simply: “The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private
property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.” 38 The point here is

33. Id. at 8–9.
34. Id. at 98–103 (using six different scenarios to illustrate that pro rata
gains and collective solutions are preferred).
35. Id. at 98.
36. For an agreement that assigns per lot, see The Reserve at Frisco LLC,
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Easements and Restrictions of The Reserve at Frisco, Article IV Section 5 (Sept. 9, 1997), http://www
.thereserveatfrisco.com/documents/declarations.pdf [hereinafter Frisco Declaration].
37. See FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 77 (discussing the history of just compensation).
38. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). The statement was
made so that the materialmen who supplied work on U.S. naval boats did not
have to foot the bill when these boats were shipped out to sea, thus dissolving
the materialmen’s liens. Id. at 48–49.
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that this general proposition is not some abstract truth that applies only to public takings. If these thought experiments and
PUD rules are correct, they embrace both present and future decisions. Our Coasean experiment lets us do the conceptual work
as if we live in a zero-transaction-cost world when we try to gain
insights on how to organize future transactions in the hightransactions-cost world of real estate markets.39 All rights and
all correlative duties are thus strictly specified between any and
all pairs of individuals (and of course larger groups) within the
system.40 These rights are well-specified on substantive rights
and governance structures, for both initial participants and their
successors in title. 41
This complete contingent-state system reduces the risk of
strategic behavior—that is, trying to guess the optimal time to
acquire or dispose of any property interest by the simple expedient of equalizing rights between any two random pair of owners
regardless of when they acquire their respective positions. 42 The
pricing decisions made in any given transaction therefore are
solely responsive to changes in market value of the various properties, and remain so whether other properties are held by their
original purchaser or some subsequent taker. 43 The rules govern
all matters of property possession, disposition, and use. Most
critically, in this universe there is no distinction whatsoever between positive and negative externalities, given the web of consent and notice that binds all present and future participants. 44
These rules are content-free. Hence, it is permissible to insist
that future owners respect aesthetic concerns equally with those
of health and safety in whatever proportions that the original
39. I have used this methodology before. See Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts,
Externalities and the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L.
& ECON. 553 (1993) [hereinafter Epstein, Holdouts] (discussing the central role
transaction costs play in organizing legal responses to many private-law problems); Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353 (1982) [hereinafter Epstein, Notice and Freedom]
(showing how the touch-and-concern requirement frustrates freedom of contract
with respect to private property).
40. Epstein, Notice and Freedom, supra note 39, at 1365–66.
41. Id.
42. For an example of just this result, see Frisco Declaration, supra note
36. The Frisco Declaration’s preamble holds that all parties and their successors
are both bound and burdened by these covenants. Id.
43. Epstein, Holdouts, supra note 39, at 555 (explaining the Coasean idea
that in a world of zero transaction costs, parties can “move resources to their
highest-valued use”).
44. Id. at 560 (explaining how universal consent offers the best way to avoid
externality problems).
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single owner thinks will maximize the total value to all property
owners.
The ideal system must not only address matters when they
go well, but also when they go badly. Knowing that litigation
costs are always positive, the astute system designer is likely to
avoid specifying unduly complex formulations of legal rights that
reduce value by adding uncertainty in the definition and enforcement of rights. 45 By the same token, the first owner has only
limited ability to predict future changes in technology and circumstances, so that vested rights in a buyer’s exclusive occupation of a designated unit are combined with a governance structure capable of dealing with problems that cannot be solved in
advance, such as the governance of common areas or the need
for future repairs and improvements. To make matters more
complex, different developers are likely to target different classes of potential buyers, which means that rules ideal for one organization may not be so for another.46 Thus the degree of quiet
and separation in a luxury PUD may be far greater than that
required in one that is tailored to a lower income group. And the
amenities and services that are supplied by developments dedicated to senior citizens will surely differ from those offered in a
PUD aimed toward households with young families. 47
In addition to these temporal demands, there is an insistent
spatial dimension. What is the optimal size of a single PUD subject to common management? There is little doubt that the increase in the number of parties governed by any arrangement
can lead to greater stresses on the governance dimension, especially if the tastes of the individual members diverge on key issues. 48 At this point, it may make perfectly good sense to divide
some initial single development into two separate ones, sepa-

45. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX
WORLD (1995) (concluding that complex legal rules hamper efficiency and
productivity).
46. See generally French, supra note 28, at 1308–09 (explaining the promissory undertakings must be devised to benefit subsequent owners in a common
unit scheme).
47. For an example of the kinds of restrictions imposed, see Nahrstedt v.
Lakeside Village Condominium Ass’n, Inc., 878 P.2d 1275, 1277–78 (Cal. 1994)
(en bank) (upholding restrictions against pets).
48. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Role of Exit Rights: What the Theory of the Firm Says About the Conduct of Brexit Negotiations, 39 CARDOZO L.
REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 108) (showing how divergent preferences led to the breakdown of the European Union).
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rated by physical boundaries and governed by different organizations. 49 In effect, what happens is that rules governing trespass and nuisance will be used to keep the two PUDs separate,
allowing, where appropriate, more specific joint ventures limited
to particular aspects of governance (e.g., dealing with common
issues, such as power supply or flood protection, that could crop
up). The point here is that the single owner has every incentive
to properly divide management in these situations, just as a complex corporation constantly considers whether it should engage
in new acquisitions or divestments in order to better align its
asset portfolio. 50 Note that divestment should be regarded as a
form of decentralized control that can be either repeated or reversed, as the case may be.
All of these variations can arise from the initial single-owner
position. That said, it still becomes critical to know exactly how,
and why, these various decisions on management and separation
are made. Indeed, the question has real urgency because, in most
common situations, neighbors do not derive their title from a
common owner, and hence need to articulate in the context of an
initial unified development an ex-post set of workable boundary
conditions, which should ideally be modeled on the partition processes that a single owner voluntarily adopts ex ante. What
works well in voluntary arrangements should create, in my view,
a presumption for how the legal system should operate between
strangers—namely any persons who obtain ownership through
separate chains of title, which is the common case in a world in
which first possession is the root of title for each separate parcel
of land. 51 Indeed, the same logic will apply even to cases of individuals who derive ownership by way of outright conveyances
from a single owner with no reserved interests or conditions, who
are generally treated as strangers, subject to rules that stress
separation and not cooperation.
In designing these rules, one further question is whether
some extrinsic substantive requirement for servitudes should
limit the freedom-of-contract approach based on consent and notice. In my view, the answer to that question is no, so that the
49. See id. at 105 (discussing how flexible rules could help “relationships to
morph from one form to another ”).
50. See id. at 104 (explaining that in reality, partnerships that overcome
conflicts of interests are rare).
51. See Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV.
1221, 1221–22 (1979) (stating “the common and civil law . . . [contain] the proposition that . . . taking possession of unowned things is the only possible way to
acquire ownership of them”).
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only limitations on these arrangements are those that address
defects in the contracting process, remedying fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, and nondisclosure, mistake, and incapacity. In general, in real estate transactions, these issues are
secondary because the high level of formality surrounding both
inspection of title and examination of the physical premises prior
to sale reduces the relevant risks. 52 Land transactions contain
multiple checkpoints against these unfair practices. 53
Yet other concerns arise. The first involves the application
of the antitrust law to landowners that have real market power.
The second involves the application of housing discrimination
laws. The former tends to have only modest application to landuse arrangements. The latter has an enormous one. I favor the
former restriction, and tend to oppose the latter.54 But for these
purposes, the key point is that in both cases the laws apply with
equal force to both the original parties and to all successors in
title.
On the other hand, the law of covenants has tended to adopt
a set of recondite restrictions on privity, touching and concerning
the land, and the performance of affirmative covenants.55 But
none of these doctrines has been allowed to block the PUD initiated by a single developer. 56 The requirement of privity was ignored in ways that let a condominium association enforce all of
its pertinent agreements. 57 The touch-and-concern requirement
covered all essential operations of the association; and affirmative covenants were allowed to collect condominium assessments.58 In principle, the law could go further. Thus the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes questions all of these
52. Richard A. Epstein, The Use and Limits of Self-Valuation Systems,
81 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 128 (2014).
53. Id.
54. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 63–64 (1995) (arguing that “reducing the
level of variance in tastes among group members” complicates collective decision-making, which in turn decreases consumer satisfaction); see also Richard
A. Epstein, Public Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Why
Freedom of Association Counts as a Human Right, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1291
(2014) (concluding that Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has “become an
instrument of repression”).
55. See, e.g., Neponsit Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank,
15 N.E.2d 793, 795 (N.Y. 1938) (discussing restrictions on covenants).
56. See, e.g., id. at 798 (disallowing the covenant restrictions to block a
PUD).
57. Id. at 797–98.
58. Id. at 795–98.
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restrictions and takes the sensible view that all rights over the
land of another—covenants, easements, licenses, and profits of
all sorts and descriptions—should be subject to uniform rules. 59
This is a welcome return to the Roman tradition of servitudes
writ large, which I have long championed.60 Professor Susan
French has long taken the position that my view ignores the
“negative impact of servitudes on patterns of land use,” without
exactly explaining which unacceptable externalities take place
and why. 61 Nonetheless, her final outlook, which has received
little judicial acceptance, resembles my own.
III. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES IN THE
PRESENCE OF HIGH TRANSACTION COSTS
It is now important to apply this theory to positive and negative externalities outside the context of PUDs created by single
owners, who, as noted, have strong incentives to impose the right
set of restrictions to maximize the value of all units after sale. 62
The best approach is to conduct a thought experiment, coupled
with an examination of the various types of agreements for these
PUDs. The correspondence between the two approaches is virtually complete. On the one side are powerful prohibitions against
common-law nuisances, subject to some predictable variations.63
On the other side lie a large number of affirmative obligations
dealing with matters such as architecture and landscaping,
which show far higher variation, usually dependent on wealth
effects and custom.64 If it is correct to respect these features in
voluntary transactions, then it is also correct to take a cue from
these practices in establishing relationships between strangers.
The resulting bottom line resembles the common law of nuisance, rationalized on efficiency grounds.
Start with negative externalities. The typical PUD has no
patience with any of the traditional large-scale nuisances routinely actionable at common law. I know of no residential or commercial arrangements that allow for persons to freely emit odors
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.12 cmt. a (AM.
LAW. INST. 2000).
60. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
61. Susan F. French, Tradition and Innovation in the New Restatement of
Servitudes: A Report from Midpoint, 27 CONN. L. REV. 119, 123 (1994).
62. See supra Part II.
63. Epstein, Holdouts, supra note 39, at 573–76.
64. See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1059–60 (5th
Cir. 1975) (illustrating that wealth and custom play a part in deciding to preserve historical architecture).
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or smells into the common areas. Yet the broad definition of nuisance reaches all “nontrespassory invasions” of the property of
another that interfere with the use and enjoyment of that property. 65 The great difficulty that arises in this area is that this
definition covers a huge number of activities that vary along two
key dimensions: the severity of the harm and the number of people who suffer from that harm.66
These variances in scale and intensity of harm are of great
conceptual importance in any closed environment, where the
possibility of reciprocal harms from parallel behaviors is enormous. In these environments, the repetition of low-level nontrespassory invasions usually generates no legal remedy, so that
people are allowed to talk in hallways and to play music in their
apartments. 67 But the question of intensity is never far from the
center of the inquiry; there are often disputes as to whether cell
phones may be used in lobbies, or when workmen can start repairs in one unit that will cause some inconvenience to others. 68
Here, there is some sensitivity to changes in settings and severity: any differences with cell phone use is not matched by the
common rules that limit heavy construction to weekday hours,
roughly between 9:00 AM and 5:00 PM.69 The motivation behind
these rules is to work a sensible accommodation between the
need for improvements and the present comfort of all residents.
The greatest noise and activity takes place during working hours
when the disruptions are likely to be lower. But when more people are at home during the evenings and on weekends the restrictions are put back into place. 70 Given that these are all done
by analysis behind a relative veil of ignorance, the regulations
will tend to be efficient. But there will be stress on the exact lines
65. See Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (N.C. 1953).
66. For a discussion of the movement from small numbers of persons to
large numbers, see Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and
Its Utilitarian Restraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 82–84 (1979) [hereinafter Epstein, Nuisance Law].
67. For the most famous expression of this live-and-let-live rule for lowlevel interactions, see Bamford v. Turnley (1862) 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 33 (Ex.)
(“The convenience of such a rule may be indicated by calling it a rule of give and
take, live and let live.”).
68. See, e.g., Noise from Construction, CITY OF NEW YORK, http://www1.nyc
.gov/nyc-resources/service/2090/noise-from-construction (last visited Apr. 26,
2018) (demonstrating that New York City requires a permit be obtained for
noise created after 6:00 PM on weekdays and on the weekend during all times).
69. Cf. ST. PAUL, MN, NOISE REGULATIONS tit. 28, ch. 293, § 293.07 (1987)
(limiting construction noise between certain hours).
70. See, e.g., Noise from Construction, supra note 68.
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of demarcation when and if certain individuals know that they
are likely to make extensive renovations where others are not.
It is critical to note that these observed patterns can easily
be carried over to transactions among strangers. 71 In this instance, one huge advantage is that, in many cases, the increase
in physical separation tends to reduce conflicts between neighbors, as many nuisances, especially noise and odors, tend to rapidly dissipate over distance. 72 Yet in the cases that do remain,
the basic rules follow the voluntary pattern very closely, with the
more severe offenses meriting the strongest responses. The
usual rule is that injunctive relief is routinely allowed against
substantial nuisances on a more or less categorical basis.73 As
there are few cases of repetitive and accidental nuisances, disputes over the basis of liability—the choice between intentional
harms, negligence, and strict liability—are relatively subdued in
this area.74 In some cases of enormous benefit, the actions may
go forward. But, unlike the oversimplified model of damages versus injunctive relief developed by Professors Guido Calabresi
and Douglas Melamed, 75 the use of injunctions and damages are
more often complements than substitutes. 76 The injunctive side
of the equation allows for conditional injunctions, bound by levels and time of emissions. 77 The damage side picks up the slack
where the injunctive relief backs off. By starting with the former
and moving cautiously to the latter, the total level of dislocations
is far lower than moving to a corner position in which one of
these remedies is adopted to the exclusion of the other. The exact
71. For a more complete account of these variations, see Epstein, supra note
66, at 67.
72. Cf. ST. PAUL, MN, NOISE REGULATIONS tit. 28, ch. 293, § 293.06 (1987)
(establishing that a noise violates the ordinance if it can be heard fifty feet outside of a building).
73. See Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution?
The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 244 (2012).
74. For the official statement, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
75. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089 (1972) (developing a framework to deal with legal problems).
76. See A. Leo Levin, Equitable Clean-Up and the Jury: A Suggested Orientation, 100 PENN. L. REV. 320, 320 (1951) (“It is familiar law that a litigant in
equity may ask and receive damages or other relief normally awarded in a court
of law. The chancellor was not deterred from adjudication such ‘legal’ issues, for
they were thought of as incidental and their disposition was necessary to the
effective termination of the entire matter in dispute.”).
77. Id. at 338.
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remedial mix is not easy to determine, but the traditional locality rule in nuisance cases suggests where levels of interference
from similar activities are reciprocal, higher levels of pollution
are allowable, so long as the emissions are confined to a particular area.78 But for lower-level nuisances, a more universal liveand-let-live rule takes over, so that neither damages nor injunctive relief is allowed, given the freedom of action that arises from
allowing these low-level nuisances is universally beneficial, especially since everyone saves on administrative costs. 79 The public law follows quite closely the patterns seen in PUDs, with one
obvious difference: private parties have greater flexibility to negotiate workable comprehensive schemes than tort litigation,
which is more difficult to fine tune. But the parallels are close.
As will become clear later, modern state regulation often strays
from these salutary principles.
The question then arises as to how positive externalities are
coordinated. In this regard, the key insight is that the level of
variation in rules, whether by design or operation, is far greater
here than in the harm-prevention realm. Virtually every adjacency has some potential to either create or undermine these
positive interactions, and it takes a huge amount of local
knowledge to specify such matters as, for example, the precise
standards governing the conformity of exterior design. Of equal
importance are the adjacencies between various units in the
larger whole. Thus, for ordinary developments, it need not be the
case that common facilities work best if all individuals have
identical sets of uses and preferences. Indeed, it is perfectly commonplace in most buildings to have units of different sizes, but
of the same general quality. This differentiation has the hidden
advantage of lowering the stress on common unit facilities that
come from peak load usage. If all persons had the same work and
lifestyle patterns, concentrated periods of high demand could
easily overwhelm communal resources. 80 Yet on the other side of
the issue, it may well be that having persons of similar tastes
and income could support larger investments in common facilities, knowing that tenants or owners in all groups will be willing
to pay rent to obtain use of the common elements and fees can
capture the various elements of value. There is no way to know
78. Epstein, Nuisance Law, supra note 66, at 87–89.
79. Id. at 84 (noting the administrative cost associated with low-level nuisances is high).
80. See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES
152–58 (1961).
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a priori which effects are greatest in what setting. But the developer’s local knowledge puts him in the best position to maximize
the cooperative surplus.
In some cases, the adjacencies involve radically different
uses at different levels. A walk down Broadway in New York City
shows one dominant pattern. The ground floor is occupied by retail space, for which street access is essential. The space generally goes below ground—in part because of a regulation that does
not count that space against the Floor-Area Ratio (FAR) that
limits volume above ground,81 and also because retail customers
often do not need natural light. Above the retail area is often
office space, close to street level and easily accessible. Hotel
space may form a third layer, above which are a range of residential units, topped off perhaps by a restaurant with a panoramic view. In some cases, the various activities are interrelated,
as patrons in the hotel eat at the restaurant, as do many of the
local residents. Such cross-fertilization is most important where
land values are greatest, so that any zoning system that specifies
single uses—residential, commercial and the like—in dense
neighbors will undercut these synergies, a point noted by Jane
Jacobs in the classic book The Death and Life of Great American
Cities, which attacked the reign of Robert Moses for its sharp
segregation of uses. 82
The next question, however, is whether it is possible to capture this system of private benefits through litigation similar to
that on the nuisance side of the ledger. The answer has both theoretical and practical sides. On the former, it is difficult to identify how a principle maps onto the private rules developed by
PUDs. To fill that gap, Professor Ariel Porat argues in favor of
an “expanded duty of restitution” to fill the asserted gap in the
current law. 83 The basic assumption of the Porat thesis is that,
“ideally,” negative and positive externalities should be subject to
the same treatment, namely one of full internalization, so that
injurers and benefactors alike are subject to the same set of ideal
incentives (as happens within the PUD). 84 The purpose here is
81. See N.Y. ZONING RESOLUTION art. VII, ch. 7, § 77-22 (2016). For a summary of the rules, see Glossary of Planning Terms, CITY OF NEW YORK, https://
www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/zoning/glossary.page#floor (last visited Apr. 26,
2018).
82. See JACOBS, supra note 80, at 131–32.
83. See Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189, 205–09 (2009).
84. Id. at 190 (“Ideally, from an economic perspective, both the negative and positive effects should be internalized by those who produce them, for
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to align incentives for the optimal creation of public goods, which
individual people have insufficient incentive to create or maintain by themselves. 85 There is a well-known inequality that
drives the analysis of public goods: social benefits are greater
than private costs, which in turn, are greater than private benefits. Unless some coercive mechanism is introduced, the private
party will only look at the last inequality so that the improvement will not be made. Porat instances the failure to create a
private park that improves amenities in the neighborhood. 86 Porat is aware of the many pitfalls that stand in the way of this
expanded duty in particular cases: some activities produce both
benefits and harms; sometimes transaction costs can exceed the
gains from organizing the activity; sometimes the rules will infringe on individual autonomy; and sometimes valuation problems will be daunting.87
What this catalogue of particulars misses, however, is the
systematic disabilities that doom this approach. Start with this
simple difference: returning to our PUD framework, the response to these externalities differs radically from case to case, 88
so that there is no set of uniform practices to serve as a template
to evaluate the role of positive externalities in interactions
among strangers. Porat acknowledges the risks of heterogeneity
when some individuals are left worse off by actions that benefit
others, to which he says his restitution duty does not apply. 89
Yet these situations are more common than is usually suspected;
the introduction of the manufacturing plant in Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 90 for example, may diminish amenities to
some while providing increased job opportunities for others.
These cases of multiple effects are so pervasive that this one exception may well swallow the rule, even if it were possible in theory to design a compensation scheme to cover all losers if the
aggregate gains are sufficiently large. Indeed, the problem of
heterogeneity goes further, because any set of diffuse benefits
with full internalization, injurers and benefactors alike will behave efficiently.”).
85. Id. at 226.
86. See id. at 191.
87. See id.
88. Compare Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 878 P.2d 1275
(Cal. 1994) (upholding restrictions against pets), with Anderson v. City of Issaquah, 851 P.2d 744 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing denial of a building permit by city development commission on aesthetic grounds).
89. Porat, supra note 83, at 220.
90. 272 U.S. 365, 380–81 (1926).
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will be valued differently by different people—assuming that
they know how to value them at all. After all, there are differences in location, view, and preferences that make it hard to
treat all individual takers within any geographical region as
though they were the same. The distribution of benefits differs
sharply from the distribution of nuisances. The latter are relatively infrequent, in part because the first person to be inconvenienced by noises and odors is often the party who generates
them, which operates as an implicit (if imperfect) deterrent to
these harms. 91
But there is no similar bit of self-constraint on the benefit
side of the equation. Quite the opposite: there is a real risk of
moral hazard, inviting people to gin up benefits for some large
and undefined class of persons for which they then can claim
compensation. The parallel behavior in nuisance cases is that of
the eager plaintiff who puts himself into harm’s way—a risky
strategy to say the least, and one that presupposes the existence
of some nuisance-like behavior. 92 The transaction-cost dynamics
therefore are wholly different in the two cases, even if, as Porat
rightly observes, the standard theory is moved to treat positive
and negative externalities in the same fashion. 93
In addition, the remedial structure is not equal to the institutional challenge. Most critically, there is no parallel on the
benefit side to injunctive relief that plays such a central role in
nuisance cases. There is no way to enjoin persons from taking
advantage of benefit for which they have made no request.94 Nor
is there any method whereby the supposed beneficiaries could
disclaim the benefit in advance, even if they knew where and
when it was likely to take place. The magnitude of these remedial difficulties is minimized by limiting the inquiry to the creation of a public park. But the logic of the expanded duty of restitution could apply to routine activities like people landscaping
their own properties, removing old shacks, or painting their
91. Cf. Epstein, Nuisance Law, supra note 66, at 100 (reasoning that a
party who creates a traffic jam will have to take into account his own delays).
92. Cf. Marina Galperina, Why Russians Are Obsessed with Dash-Cams,
JALOPNIK (Feb. 15, 2013), https://jalopnik.com/why-russians-are-obsessed-with
-dash-cams-5918159 (describing Russian insurance fraud whereby drivers deliberately create traffic accidents in an effort to sue others).
93. See generally Porat, supra note 83 (arguing that while the law treats
positive and negative externalities differently, they should be treated identically).
94. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT,
§ 2(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“ There is no liability in restitution for an unrequested benefit voluntarily conferred.”).
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houses. The scope of the benefit cannot be traced out by watching
physical interactions, as is the case with noises and smells. It is
thus always difficult to figure out how wide to draw the circle of
benefits in complex neighborhoods characterized by different
types of land uses, because some, like nuisances, have intensely
local effects while others, like regional growth, may have neighborhood-wide effects. 95 Indeed, the high frequency of these beneficial interactions will likely lead to situations where changes
in market value are attributable to the combined activities of
multiple parties, posing general brainteasers under the law of
joint-and-several liability.
As the frequency of these beneficial interactions increases,
the valuation problems become more acute and the gains from
legal intervention necessarily diminish. This accumulation of
difficulties matters. In some cases, where there are systematic
benefits to be gained, it is possible to rely on informal social pressures to get sloppy neighbors to bring their properties up to
standard.96 Yet in general it would be disastrous to offer subsidies to individuals to mow their own lawns or to paint their shutters a nice shade of green. There will be no agreement as to
which activities should receive that subsidy, how much they
should be paid, who should be required to bear the brunt of the
costs, or underwrite the public costs of administering such a system. Still, some direct public investments (in contradistinction
to payments to individual landowners) could work in connection
with positive amenities like the creation of parks. Thus it is common today to allow for various tax breaks for the creation of
preservation easements for either wildlife or historic structures,
which uses a system of matching grants to achieve the needed
subsidy at far lower costs. 97 Occasionally, legislative or administrative standards may help fill the gap, although these schemes

95. Compare Shore v. Maple Lane Farms, LLC, 411 S.W.3d 405 (Tenn.
2013) (holding that amplified music concerts on a farm could constitute a nuisance), with Hood River Cty. v. Mazzara, 89 P.3d 1195 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (interpreting a county ordinance regarding barking dogs).
96. See ANDREW JAY KAUFMAN, WHERE THE LAWN MOWER STOPS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ALTERNATIVE FRONT YARD IDEOLOGIES 3–4 (2000),
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=18351&context=rtd
(explaining how informal social norms help ensure all neighbors maintain their
lawns).
97. For a primer, see TECH. PRES. SERVS., NAT’L PARK SERV., EASEMENTS
TO PROTECT HISTORIC PROPERTIES: A USEFUL HISTORIC PRESERVATION TOOL
WITH POTENTIAL TAX BENEFITS (2010), https://www.nps.gov/tps/tax-incentives/
taxdocs/easements-historic-properties.pdf.
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themselves can easily get carried away by excessive enforcement. 98 In the end, it may well be that in a world of imperfect
administrative enforcement it is appropriate to provide no legal
mechanism for the creation of certain positive externalities. This
last discussion thus paves the way for a more synoptic overview
of the strengths and pitfalls of various schemes for land-use regulation.
IV. PUBLIC LAND-USE REGULATION: ZONING AND
AFFORDABLE HOUSING MANDATES
This analysis of housing markets generates what I have
called in other contexts the “separability thesis.” 99 The basic insight is that covert wealth transfers of all sorts should not be
allowed to cloud appropriate judgments for the efficient use of
resources in light of the lessons learned from the single-owner
hypothesis. 100 In the current legal environment of extensive
land-use regulation, however, political forces often seek major
redistributive objectives, so that land-use regulation takes on
the role of creating transfers across different groups under the
guise of dealing with various positive and negative externalities.101 The point here is not that there are no schemes of regulation that serve legitimate functions, for, in principle, it is always possible that some system of land-use regulation can
overcome coordination problems for private owners in a way that
leaves all regulated parties better off than they were before. I
will mention two such opportunities here. The first is a sign ordinance that requires all signs to be of a certain size and flush
against their buildings. This ordinance gets rid of sign clutter
and reduces the probability that one sign will block another from
view. In those cases, where the ordinance improves the value of
all properties, regulation should be welcome because it provides,
in the form of restriction against like abuses by others, in-kind
compensation for the loss of total freedom in mounting signs on
property. Similarly, an ordinance that requires uniform archi98. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Issaquah, 851 P.2d 744, 755 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1993) (reversing the denial of a building permit by a city development commission based on aesthetic concerns).
99. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Innovation and Inequality: The Separability Thesis, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2016) (applying the phrase to
intellectual property).
100. See supra Part II.
101. See Amnon Lehavi, Zoning and Market Externalities, 44 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 361, 383 (2017).
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tecture in historical districts can also pass that test, if the exterior creates additional value for its owners as a tourist destination.102 When necessary, this scheme can be supplemented by a
real estate tax abatement if the benefits generated go to parties
outside of the regulated district. Unfortunately, most systems of
land-use regulation do not resemble these well-tailored interventions. Below are three important examples—Euclidian zoning, 103 affordable housing, and the Mount Laurel “fair share”
rule 104—of how matters can go awry.
The use of zoning in American life began in the first three
decades of the twentieth century with efforts to control a wide
range of land-use problems dealing with high density and the
adjacency of inconsistent land uses. 105 The use of the singleowner model indicates some of the rich complexities that arise in
this area. All of these zoning plans seek to take into account the
height, the placement, and the bulk of buildings and other structures, both because of the interdependences among them, and
because of the enormous impact that buildings have on light and
views (where the question is not whether these views are ever
blocked, but rather the manner in which they block those
views). 106 In dealing with this issue, it would be dangerous to
dismiss all zoning regulations that go beyond the scope of the
nuisance law as unwise, but it is very difficult to come up with a
metric that allows for good regulations to be sorted out from bad
ones.
The first zoning laws were relatively modest in their scope,
dealing with such matters as height restrictions, 107 on the one
hand, and setback restrictions on the other. 108 The court decisions upholding these regimes often rested on a mixture of two
102. See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1060, 1060 n.45
(5th Cir. 1975) (upholding an ordinance intended to preserve historic buildings
in New Orleans’ French Quarter).
103. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
104. S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I),
336 A.2d 713, 724 (N.J. 1975).
105. For a concise summary of the various issues, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON
ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS, 57–68 (4th ed. 2013).
106. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 379–81 (describing the zoning plan); Mount Laurel I, 366 A.2d at 719–20 (describing the zoning plan); Anderson v. City of Issaquah, 851 P.2d 744, 746–47 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (describing the zoning
plan).
107. See, e.g., Welsh v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 100 (1909) (upholding building
height restrictions in certain areas of Boston).
108. See, e.g., Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 610 (1927) (sustaining setback
restrictions on public health and safety grounds).
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dominant themes in takings law. The first is that there is a police-power justification for preventing disease from overcrowding
and distress from dark areas.109 The second is that the general
scope of the ordinance means that there are reciprocal benefits
to all the parties subject to it. 110 I will not go into the difficulties
in these cases, which are close, 111 but it is important to note that
zoning ordinances often take on a far more corrosive position,
and consequently survive only because of the high level of deference that, starting with Euclid, 112 judges give to the legislators
and administrators who put these laws into effect.
Euclid is the most conspicuous illustration of this dangerous
trend; a case in which, the United States Supreme Court upheld
a comprehensive zoning scheme for the development of land in
the Cleveland suburb of Euclid.113 At issue in that case was the
zoning for a single contiguous sixty-eight-acre plot of land located between a major thoroughfare on the one side and a railroad on the other.114 The applicable zoning ordinance broke this
plot up into three horizontal bands.115 U-2 was suitable for twofamily homes, and U-3 for apartment houses. 116 Finally, U-6, located only 130 feet away from U-2, was zoned to “include plants
for sewage disposal and for producing gas, garbage and refuse
incineration, scrap iron, junk, scrap paper and rag storage, aviation fields, cemeteries, crematories, penal and correctional institutions, insane and feeble minded institutions, storage of oil
and gasoline (not to exceed 25,000 gallons).” 117
This zoning scheme was a recipe for land-use disaster, because it undid the benefits for land-use planning created by the
single owner who could account for all externalities, positive or
negative, from the development of the entire plot, which, given
its size and access, was ideal for an integrated manufacturing
plant. Its large size made it possible for self-imposed setbacks to
109. See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1058–64 (5th
Cir. 1975).
110. See, e.g., Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378, 1384 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1982) (“[P]laintiff must show . . . that he has been denied the reciprocal benefits
of a common zoning plan.”).
111. For a discussion of these difficulties, see Richard A. Epstein, Disappointed Expectations: How the Supreme Court Failed To Clean Up Takings Law
in Murr v. Wisconsin, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 151 (2017).
112. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
113. Id. at 397.
114. Id. at 379.
115. Id. at 380.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 381.
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reduce any nuisance-like complications with neighbors. Why
then introduce new unnecessary territorial divisions that create
unwanted land-use conflicts by forcing the physical coexistence
of incompatible uses? Indeed, the ordinance allegedly reduced
the plot value by about seventy-five percent without generating
any offsetting benefits to nearby neighbors.118 Yet Euclid allowed the government to impose heavy disparate burdens without using the compensation devices that are common for this
purpose in PUDs. 119 Freed therefore from any kind of price constraint, it is not surprising that the ordinance blocked all construction on that plot until the property was ultimately used for
a defense plant during World War II, disregarding the zoning
plan.120 The signaling function of a price system is systematically ignored when government officials are given discretion to
use regulations to transfer wealth from one party to another. 121
The larger significance of Euclid derives from two separate
reasons. The first is that it enshrined a highly deferential rational-basis test that allowed all sorts of zoning schemes to be
validated even when they resulted in systematic losses in land
value in all sorts of other contexts. 122 In effect, the rules permitted the imposition of zoning restrictions with a conspicuous disparate impact, directed chiefly toward anticompetitive ends that
had little or nothing to do with the control of nuisances. The shift
itself is marked by the adoption in 1961 of a much-expanded New
York City zoning ordinance that shifted attention away from external effects on light and air toward the use that took place
within the walls, which made it difficult to repurpose various
buildings when economic conditions occurred, including the conversion of old manufacturing facilities into artist lofts. 123 Second,
118. See id. at 384 (stating that the complaint alleged the prezoning value of
the land was $10,000 and that the postzoning value was only $2500).
119. Euclid denied recovery for the substantial devaluation of the property
at issue. See id. For a state law covering PUD compensation, see Bert J. Harris,
Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (2017).
120. See ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 105, at 96.
121. Cf. Kim Jung-kwan, Energy Not a Political Issue, KOREA JOONGANG
DAILY (Jan. 18, 2013), http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article
.aspx?aid=2965687 (arguing that government energy price subsidies undermine
corporate confidence in market institutions).
122. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 392 (describing possibilities that would satisfy
the rational-basis test).
123. See Norman Marcus, New York City Zoning—1961–1991: Turning Back
the Clock—But with an Up-to-the-Minute Social Agenda, 19 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 707, 710–11 (1992) (discussing a 1961 New York City ordinance revision
that severely limited flexibility in updating property uses).
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Euclid’s model of separate zones for different kinds of activities
ignored the huge positive externalities that can come from mixing different kinds of uses in the same zone. 124 In this regard,
the model of the modern multiple-use building is one example.
Indeed, it was just this theme that Jane Jacobs hammered home
back in 1961: single-use districts create dead zones in uses that
multiple-use districts can fill. 125 To be sure, the question is always empirical, for heavy manufacturing may well not fit in with
various forms of residential and commercial use. But it bears
noting that the failure of modern zoning schemes is that they
rest on what Friedrich Hayek termed the “fatal conceit” that central planners can move quickly and accurately to create the necessary synergies and separations. 126 It turns out that all too often they cannot, for the reasons that always stand in the path of
central planning: ignorance and bias.
The second major mistake in modern Euclidian zoning law
is its constant effort to create some major form of wealth redistribution through regulation that has a differential effect on different participants. As argued earlier, the use of the singleowner theory does not seek to create redistribution between various groups but rather to ensure through competition that all
these arrangements economize both the internalization of externalities and the creation of common public goods. 127 In dealing
with these issues, it often, but by no means always, suggests that
individual PUDs will have a membership that best reduces conflicts, increases cooperation, and allows for the efficient uses of
common spaces. This austere model does not survive well in situations where the ability to use the permit power allows the
state to force selected groups to change the mix of residents in
PUDs. 128 Two common ways in which this can be done is through
affordable housing mandates, often called inclusionary zoning,
and through state mandates that local communities provide
124. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 389–90 (describing the impact and legality of
having separate zones for different kinds of activities).
125. See JACOBS, supra note 80, at 152–77.
126. See generally F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 113 (Bruce Caldwell
ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 2007) (discussing the restrictions on speed and efficiency
of government action when hindered by numerous considerations); F.A. HAYEK,
THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM 21 (W.W. Brantley III ed.,
Univ. of Chi. Press 1991) (stating the “fatal conceit” concept rests in the collective overconfidence in the belief “that the ability to acquire skills stems from
reason”).
127. See supra Part II.
128. Cf. Wilson v. Borough of Mountainside, 201 A.2d 540, 541, 453 (N.J.
1964) (upholding decision of planning review for land-use control).
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their “fair share” of low- and moderate-income housing. Both of
these popular programs run into major difficulties because the
obligations in question, following on the tradition of Euclid, are
imposed on developers and local communities without payment
of just compensation.
The standard view of an affordable housing program is that
local and state governments require a developer to reserve a certain fraction of new housing for tenants or buyers who are members of protected classes. 129 The developer is allowed to offset the
losses that come from these obligations by raising, to the extent
that the market will allow, the rents or sale prices on the market-rate units. In the United States, these programs are often
defended as a way to offset the serious shortage of decent, safe,
and sanitary housing for persons and families of low or moderate
income given “an absolute present and future shortage of supply
in relation to demand.”130 At no point do the defenders of these
ordinances explain why supply and demand are perpetually out
of equilibrium, for which the obvious answer is that the massive
regulation of these housing markets—through a combination of
zoning laws, rent-control ordinances, building codes, permit restrictions, disability-access rules, special permits, and taxes—
drives up the cost of low- and moderate-income housing.131 But
instead of seeking to remove the obstacles that block market activity, they impose restrictions on landlords and sellers that result in costly and often counterproductive behaviors. 132 Unfortunately, these systems are a clever form of price controls, for the

129. For my analysis of these issues, see Richard A. Epstein, The Unassailable Case Against Affordable Housing Mandates, in EVIDENCE AND INNOVATION
IN HOUSING LAW AND POLICY 64 (Lee Fennell & Benjamin Keys eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2017) [hereinafter Epstein, The Unassailable Case Against Affordable Housing Mandates].
130. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 50003(a) (West 2018). The San Jose affordable housing program, which “requires all new residential development projects of 20 or more units to sell at least 15 percent of the for-sale units at a price
that is affordable to low or moderate income households,” was sustained against
constitutional challenge on Euclid-like grounds in California Building Industry
Ass’n v. City of San Jose. 351 P.3d 974, 978 (Cal. 2015). For my critique, see
Epstein, The Unassailable Case Against Affordable Housing Mandates, supra
note 129, at 65.
131. See Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57 UCLA L. REV. 983, 997 (2010) (discussing the higher production
costs of subsidized housing).
132. See Laura L. Westray, Are Landlords Being Taken by the Good Cause
Eviction Requirement?, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 321, 323 (1988) (discussing the systematic risk that landlords will be deprived of their right to exclude, which is
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limitations of price on some units necessarily limits the total revenue that can be obtained from the entire production run, leading to chronic shortages. To make matters worse, the mandates
for affordable housing often work badly because they require interactions among different income groups that would not normally choose to live in the same project, even if they are quite
happy to live in the same general neighborhood. 133 These costs
come from two sources. First, the need to rent or sell to two or
three classes of occupants in a single building drives up the cost
of construction by requiring different materials and layouts that
must be spread uniformly throughout the project. 134 It also
drives up the cost of marketing by requiring separate and specialized brokerage staffs (common throughout all markets from
land to cosmetics) to rent or sell separately to members of each
group. 135 And for the subsidized groups, potential tenants must
be prescreened to determine eligibility for inclusion in the various programs. 136 On the demand side, the mixing of different income groups tends to drive away wealthier clienteles who want
extensive services and amenities (e.g. twenty-four-hour doorman
service) that other occupants cannot afford. 137 In some cases, developers have sought to beat back the force of these restrictions
“one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property” (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982))).
133. See Naomi J. McCormick et al., The New Stigma of Relocated Public
Housing Residents: Challenges to Social Identity in Mixed-Income Developments, 11 CITY & COMMUNITY 285, 289 (2012) (“ The development of mixed-income housing was an intentional effort to counteract public housing stigma, but
produced countervailing forces.”); Jarred Schenke, Is HUD’s $6B Mixed-Income
Housing Strategy to Blame for Housing Shortage, BISNOW (Mar. 10, 2017),
https://www.bisnow.com/national/news/construction-development/huds
-funding-faces-uncertainty-for-mixed-income-players-71491 (stating there is
“little evidence that people with higher incomes mingle in any meaningful way
with lower-income families in the same project”).
134. See ROBERT HICKEY, CTR. FOR HOUS. POLICY, AFTER THE DOWNTURN:
NEW CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR INCLUSIONARY HOUSING 9 (2013)
(discussing the increase in costs of infill sites for inclusionary housing developments).
135. AARON GORNSTEIN & ANN VERRILLI, MIXED-INCOME HOUSING IN THE
SUBURBS: LESSONS FROM MASSACHUSETTS 19 (2006) (discussing affirmative
marketing requirements).
136. See, e.g., Mark Joseph & Robert Chaskin, Living in a Mixed-Income Development: Resident Perceptions of the Benefits and Disadvantages of Two Developments in Chicago, 47 URB. STUD. 2347, 2357 (2010) (discussing the increased screening of mixed-income developments).
137. See Patrick Bayer et al., Separate When Equal?: Racial Inequality and
Residential Segregation 30 (Yale Working Papers on Econ. Applications & Policy, Discussion Paper No. 9, 2005), https://economics.yale.edu/sites/default/files/
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by creating separate lobbies and elevators for the two groups. 138
But that in turn provokes a fierce legislative response against
the “poor door,” which can easily derail the project in its entirety. 139 The correct way to handle this situation is for the state
to compensate (in cash) the developer for the losses attributable
to these multiple impositions, costs that are likely to prove so
expensive that they will not be borne as the price is too high. A
simpler scheme uses more efficient separation to provide low-income persons with payments that allow them to receive subsidized housing without disrupting the general practices, whose
efficiency rationales regulators often fail to understand.
The same difficulties arise with larger efforts to create balanced communities outside of any single development. The most
dramatic illustration of this practice comes from the endless litigation in the Mount Laurel saga, beginning with the 1975 decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel.140 The court managed to find a right to sufficient levels of low- and moderate-income housing in a Blackstone-like constitutional provision that
reads: “All persons are by nature free and independent, and have
certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those
of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining
safety and happiness.” 141 The intellectual transformation from a
system of limited government to a comprehensive positive entitlement to government financial support on a state-wide basis
was made without any explanation. But that result differs massively from the single-owner paradigm used to organize land-use
files/Working-Papers/wp000/ddp0009.pdf (“We motivated our hypothesis by
documenting that middle-class black neighborhoods are in short supply given
the current black sociodemographic structure in many U.S. metropolitan areas,
forcing high-SES blacks either to live in predominantly white neighborhoods
with high levels of neighborhood amenities or in more black neighborhoods with
lower amenity levels.”).
138. See, e.g., Emily Badger, When Separate Doors for the Poor Are More
than They Seem, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (July 31, 2014), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/07/31/when-the-poor-want-their
-own-door (discussing the proposal for an apartment with different amenities
for its “affordable units”).
139. See, e.g., S. 6012, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015) (amending housing
and rent control law).
140. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975). For one account of the decisions, see the New
Jersey Digital Legal Library, which has collected many of the primary materials. N.J. DIG. LEGAL LIBRARY, http://njlegallib.rutgers.edu/mtlaurel/
aboutmtlaurel.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2018).
141. N.J. CONST, art. I, § 1.
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issues insofar as it requires that each unit of local government
provide its fair share of low- and moderate-income housing.142 It
is now over forty years since the New Jersey Supreme Court announced this basic fair-share obligation. Yet the imbroglio is still
unresolved. 143 It is critical to understand why.
New Jersey, like many states, has authorized comprehensive zoning codes that go far beyond the requirements of the law
of nuisance and far beyond the requirements that are found in
any PUD, all of which favor growth over redistribution. 144 These
government codes are often passed to advance the lofty goals of
safe and balanced communities that hearken back to Euclid. 145
At this point, the first-best solution is to knock down the initial
restrictive land-use regulation that blocked all low- and moderate-income housing. On that view, developers could have constructed adequate housing projects located in places where their
targeted customers wanted to live without creating any local
nuisances. From this perspective, there would be no need for
state subsidies, and there would be no need to adopt special rules
for forcing these projects into particular communities under an
ambitious statewide plan. But that ship has sailed. Now that the
zoning laws are set in legal stone, local communities, acting in
response to judicial pressure, have to concoct ad hoc exceptions
to them.146 Since the notion of fair share cannot be operationalized, the basic scope of the obligation has to be determined for
hundreds of separate communities, all of which have different
142. See, e.g., William W. Merrill III & Robert K. Lincoln, Linkage Fees and
Fair Share Regulations: Law and Method, 25 URB. LAW. 223, 229 (1993) (describing Florida’s Planning Act that requires local governments to plan for affordable housing).
143. For round two of the litigation, see Southern Burlington County NAACP
v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983). For
the arguments up through 1987, see John M. Payne, Rethinking Fair Share:
The Judicial Enforcement of Affordable Housing Policies, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 20
(1987) (highlighting the problematic Mount Laurel decision and proposing a
new approach to fair share). For a 2010 reprise, see generally MARCIA A. KARROW ET AL., HOUSING OPPORTUNITY TASK FORCE, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2010) (recommending changes to New Jersey’s affordable housing practices).
144. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN CODE § 5:43-1.1 (2018) (“ The purpose of the Neighborhood Preservation Balanced Housing Program is to provide municipalities,
for-profit and non-profit developers with financial assistance needed to spur the
development of affordable housing across the State . . . .”).
145. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 725–26 (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
146. See Banville v. Los Angeles, 4 Cal. Rptr. 458, 569 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1960) (discussing an ordinance providing the Regional Planning Commission
the authority to grant a zoning exception).
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population bases and different commercial and industrial activities. 147 No ordinary mortal can discharge this Herculean task
with any degree of certainty. But it is certain that local governments will use all the resources at their disposal to keep out lowincome families, often because of the additional tax burden that
it will place on other landowners to fund the public education
required for the influx of families with school-age children.148 It
is impossible to describe in a short paper the vitriol and intrigue
that has beset this program at every stage. But it is possible to
note that these programs, like those for affordable housing mandates, all involve efforts to impose patterned principles—some
externally desired end—on communities that are not consistent
with the single-owner models developed here. 149 Again, it is
worth repeating that the situation would work far better if the
government were authorized to use eminent domain power to
purchase lands on which the various housing could be located.
In that case, the state could organize a budget, and determine
how to allocate it across communities. It could also exercise that
power without local consent, and buy off the resistance of key
landowners by offering full compensation. None of this was done.
It is not therefore appropriate to dwell on the pathologies that
were built into the program as early as 1975, as such defects can
never be removed. The limits of coercion, the dangers of faction,
and the want of coherent knowledge all doomed the plan to failure.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper is to offer a conceptual explanation of how to make sound land-use development decisions in the
face of the pervasive positive and negative externalities caused
by all human actions. The key move is to start with a universe
in which no externalities are possible, namely those in which all
persons take either directly or by way of succession from a single
owner who has the proper incentives to internalize all gains and
losses from future productive activity. The gains that are given
to one person generate the prospect of additional revenues, but
147. See Payne, supra note 143, at 26 (describing the complexity of the proposed fair-share formulas).
148. Cf. GORNSTEIN & VERRILLI, supra note 135, at 7 (discussing the increase in families with school-aged children in communities with reputable
school systems).
149. For the notable critique of patterned principles, see ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 149–231 (1974).
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the correlative losses generate offsetting revenue losses. All decisions therefore involve the correct form of netting out gains and
losses so that the socially optimum result is obtainable whenever
the single owner maximizes that gain.
In dealing with these issues, one discovers, both in theory
and in practice, that the control of nuisance-like activities generates a more or less uniform set of responses that serve as a
template to set boundary arrangements between two or more
parties that do not derive their ownership rights from a common
source. Hence the law of trespass and nuisance turns out to be
relatively easy to impose and, in general, can be made to work
well. But the set of positive benefits from gainful interactions
varies widely across different projects, especially given the mix
of parties who buy into the scheme, so that it is far harder to
generate a set of rules for paying restitution for unrequested
benefits between strangers. The effort to use private-law remedies generally fails because the benefits are too numerous and
ill-defined. Sometimes a legal regulation might work, although
there is risk of overregulation. Often social pressures may be the
best system for dealing with these lost opportunities.
What is clear, however, is that any system of public law
magnifies the risks of major economic dislocations. The private
logic of the single owner does not afford any support for efforts
to create extensive zoning schemes that not only separate parties
but also specify particular uses for particular locations, or which
require extensive cross-subsidies for affordable or fair-housing
programs. Often these goals are unattainable, even if the state
offers compensation for the parties whose property is taken for
some allegedly larger social objective. It is therefore necessary to
learn once again the limits of law in solving all social problems.
A system of decentralized property rights controls most of the
negative externalities. A system of private regulation can capture most of the positive externalities. It is always necessary to
remind ourselves that the effort to push legal controls into uncharted territories often does more harm than good.

